Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Faculty Research & Creative Activity

History

August 2008

“Partisan for the Hard Hats”: Charles Colson,
George Meany, and the Failed Blue-Collar Strategy
Edmund F. Wehrle
Eastern Illinois University, efwehrle@eiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/history_fac
Part of the History Commons
Recommended Citation
Wehrle, Edmund F., "“Partisan for the Hard Hats”: Charles Colson, George Meany, and the Failed Blue-Collar Strategy" (2008).
Faculty Research & Creative Activity. 23.
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/history_fac/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Research & Creative
Activity by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

“ Partisan for the Hard Hats”: Charles Colson, George Meany,
and the Failed Blue-Collar Strategy
Edmund F. Wehrle
On May 5, 1970, Jay Lovestone, the tenacious ex-communist who headed the
AFL-CIO’s vehemently anticommunist International Affairs Department,
arrived for a secret rendezvous with Charles Colson, President Richard Nixon’s
devoted-to-a-fault aide. A year before, the president assigned Colson the
job of cultivating blue-collar workers as part of a grand push to build a broad
Nixon coalition for the 1972 election with the potential to reshape American
electoral politics. Colson experienced only resistance for almost a year, but Nixon’s
defiant invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970 brought an unanticipated
breakthrough. Lovestone simply could not have been more supportive
or forthcoming. Nixon, the AFL-CIO foreign policy expert told Colson, was
the “first president since Harry Truman to have real guts.” Lovestone vowed
“to activate all the international resources of the AFL-CIO” in support of the
president, and the pair jointly drafted a pro-Nixon statement for the AFL-CIO
Executive Council, praising the Cambodian incursion.1
The Cambodian invasion, in fact, set in motion an awkward, brief alliance
between the White House and key leaders of the AFL-CIO. Nixon’s “blue-collar
strategy” helped him win the 1972 election and, according to some, put a final nail
in the coffin of the once-powerful New Deal voting coalition.2 While historians have
focused on Nixon’s supposedly clever manipulations of the cultural alienation of white
urban workers, the president’s so-called blue-collar strategy rose overwhelmingly on one
issue: the unique politics of the Vietnam War — a war in which the AFL-CIO and many,
if not all, of its members had much invested.3 It was largely on the basis of the war that
AFL-CIO leaders and many rank-and-file members were drawn temporarily to Nixon.
But the war hardly provided a permanent boost to either Nixon or his plans to make over
American politics. Indeed, an enduring Democratic coalition and deep misgivings about
the president, especially his controversial economic policies, hobbled the blue-collar
strategy, which collapsed permanently in 1973, the victim of Watergate and a crumbling
economy. Although Nixon did seek to fashion a broad cultural appeal to workers, such
entreaties — far from exhibiting any deep understanding of working-class sensibilities —
were in fact marked by a clumsy, awkward, and ineffectual identity politics.4 In the end,
the blue-collar strategy rose on foreign policy and fell on economics; the president’s
shoddy cultural campaign remained at best an ill-executed sideshow.
Elected by only the slimmest of margins against a bitterly divided Democratic Party
in 1968, Nixon had reason to fear for his political future as he assumed office. Likely
to face more unified opposition in the next election, the new president fully understood
the imperative of broadening his political base. Already Kevin Phillips, a senior
strategist for Nixon’s 1968 campaign, and others had outlined strategies for expanding
the appeal of the Republican Party. In his book The Emerging Republican Majority,

Phillips argued the traditional New Deal coalition was well on its way to splintering.
Under the pressure of urban chaos and rapid societal change, ethnic and workingclass
voters in particular seemed to be straying from the Democratic camp.5 In the
1968 presidential elections, organized labor in the United States spent a record $60
million in support of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, but that painful political
year had been rife with signs of tension between organized labor and the Democratic
Party. Many labor leaders seethed in resentment against liberals who were slow
to support the more hawkishly inclined Humphrey. Meanwhile, those same leaders
struggled to thwart blue-collar support for the insurgent George Wallace campaign,
the appeal of which went beyond the governor’s hostility to civil rights.6 In his righteous
anger, Wallace seemed to sum up the anxieties of many workers toward the rapidly
changing social and cultural scene. P. L. Siemiller, president of the International
Association of Machinists (IAM), for instance, virtually echoed the Wallace line when
he told delegates at the 1968 IAM convention that “union members who have worked
so hard to build this country are pretty tired of rioters, looters, peaceniks, beatniks,
and all the rest of the nuts who are trying to destroy it.”7
Nixon had every incentive to try to take advantage of these developments, but
besides political opportunity, the new president’s odd psychology clearly contributed
to his interest in cultivating blue-collar support (and his carelessness in going about
it). The product of a humble background that often left him ill at ease in the corridors
of power, Nixon bitterly resented those he saw as the intellectual and cultural
elite — the media, academia, and liberal power brokers. Instead, he instinctively
sympathized with labor leaders, whom he saw as tough, blunt, gutsy, and operating
outside the political mainstream. In a private White House meeting with Richard
Scammon, coauthor of the influential book The Real Majority, Nixon dwelled “at some
length” on his admiration for AFL-CIO President George Meany, who “despite his
da’s, dem’s, and do’s would come in, would see a problem, would be willing to have
the guts and courage to do what had to be done.” By contrast, added the president,
“there is not a college professor in the U.S. today whom he could rely upon to have
the same perception.”8
From his earliest days in office, then, Nixon sought to cultivate both blueCollar voters and trade union leaders. The president assigned Charles (Chuck) Colson,
a self-proclaimed “partisan for the ‘hard hats,’ ” the task of drawing both rank
and file and labor leadership into a planned “new majority” coalition. Central to this
job was “squeezing, cajoling and jawboning” Meany, whose support the president
particularly coveted.9
Like Nixon, Colson bore no guiding political philosophy save opportunism
and a general resentment of the establishment. He grew up in Boston in lowermiddle- class circumstances. A self-described “outsider to the establishment” and
“swamp Yankee,” Colson fit in “neither with the new ethnics . . . nor the old stock.”
Of his family, he recalled “acceptance was what we were denied and what we most
fervently sought.” As a young man, he cut his teeth in the rough-and-tumble world
of Boston politics working for liberal Republicans, such as Governor Robert Bradford

and Senator Leverett Saltonstall.10 No doubt his ideological vacuity and background
in urban politics where labor and ethnicity figured prominently primed Colson for
his “hard hat” assignment.
Although Meany had a well-deserved reputation as a hawk on Vietnam and
rarely missed an opportunity to criticize the antiwar movement, Colson made little
headway with the union chief. Nixon himself did not help the cause. At their first
White House meeting, Meany found the president annoyingly eager to please and
“sort of exuberant, sort of bounding around.” As he ushered the labor chief out of
the Oval Office, Nixon stopped to introduce his secretary, Rose Mary Woods. “She’s
a Catholic, too, George,” the president commented. The obsequious comment, an
example of the president’s awkward pandering and unsophisticated identity politics,
backfired. Meany later recalled his irritation. “What the hell was that? As if that was
important to me! What the hell did I care what she was.” Meany had similar trouble
warming up to other Nixon officials. Attorney General John Mitchell, Meany
complained, greeted him like a “lump of granite, no smile on his face.”11
Nor did Nixon’s initial foreign policy impress the hawkish Meany. The AFLCIO
president complained to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that he was
“appalled at the lack of discipline in the new administration as evidenced by conflicting
statements” on Vietnam.12 Jay Lovestone, head of the AFL-CIO’s international
affairs department, echoed Meany’s concerns, fearing the new “administration would
be inclined to flee from the Asian theater” and complaining bitterly of Nixon’s
“bookkeeping attitude on foreign assistance.”13
Colson hardly enjoyed more success with the rank and file. He appears to
have whittled away his first several months of work seeking out some grand symbolic
event or gesture to attract the interest of blue-collar workers. By the summer of
1970, Colson felt he had seized upon something. “I have finally, after many months
of work produced a Catholic, veteran, hard-hat all in one,” reported Colson to Press
Secretary Ron Ziegler. “He is obviously the answer to all our problems and I can have
him jump out of the box any time.”14 In Colson’s “box” was one Benjamin M. Garcia,
who volunteered to drive his ride-on lawnmower from New York City to the White
House. There, he planned to deliver a petition signed by one million voters in support
for Nixon’s policies, after which he apparently planned to cut the South Lawn, possibly
with the president on board. Few even among Nixon’s supporters could take the
scheme seriously. Told of Garcia’s plans, Lyn Nofzinger, Republican National
Committee communications director, quipped, “It will be a sod thing if this doesn’t pan
out.”15 In the end, Garcia, largely ignored by the media, arrived at the White House
only to be met by a presidential aide who accepted the petition.16
The Garcia escapade reflected the extent to which Colson’s blue-collar mission
overlapped with another of his charges — that of recruiting the support of supposedly
“unmelted” white ethnic communities nestled in urban areas.17 Informed by
an awkward combination of simplistic stereotypes and a rudimentary sense of identity
politics, Colson set out to cultivate “nationalities” by appealing to mutually shared

values — however nebulous. In the case of Italian Americans, for instance, Colson
urged the president to ban the Justice Department from using the terms “mafia” and
“costa nostra.” Before a scheduled White House meeting with leaders of the Sons of
Italy, Colson counseled the president to bemoan the “so-called intellectual elite who
want to tear down our institutions” and talk “about patriotism generally . . . about this
group’s devotion to community and family.”18 The administration’s strategy, it
appeared, focused largely on stoking group resentment rather than cultivating any
true appreciation of ethnic heritage.
For help, Colson turned to the Republican National Committee’s Heritage
Groups Division, which supplied him with a thick “set of nationality folders containing
statistical data, press and radio listings, nationality organizations, [and a] report of
Republican activities within the nationality group.”19 Committee officials included a
ranking of ethnic groups based on what the group had given to the Republican Party.
20 From there, as he had done with Garcia, Colson searched for some symbol or
initiative to promote the administration’s commitment to a particular “nationality.”
For instance, Colson badgered Secretary of Transportation John Volpe for names of
qualified Italian Americans to appoint to administration jobs.21
Beyond keeping Colson busy, none of his schemes bore any real fruit. There
is no record, for instance, of Volpe responding to Colson’s requests. Beyond general
incompetence, other roadblocks hampered Colson’s progress. The White House’s
political initiatives, in particular, often seemed to work at cross purposes. Early in
his presidency, Nixon’s Labor Department had pressed the so-called Philadelphia
Plan, designed to reform traditionally nepotistic, racist employment practices in the
construction trades industries. Nixon’s intent appears to have been to seek African
American support and drive a wedge between liberals and labor leaders. Whatever
the motive, the Philadelphia Plan, named for a prototype program begun in the city
of brotherly love, infuriated labor leaders, who quickly made their displeasure public;
the president then began furiously backpedaling. At a meeting with an assembly
of construction trades union leaders in the spring of 1970, Nixon awkwardly insisted
he favored only a “voluntary approach,” not a mandatory, heavily regulated affirmative
action program. “While not backing away from our support for the Philadelphia
Plan,” the president told the assemblage, “we, too, favor these ‘home town’ solutions.”
Nixon then obsequiously outlined plans for a committee to “devote attention to one
of our great national needs — the need to restore pride in a craft and to promote the
dignity of skilled labor.”22
The on-again, off-again Philadelphia Plan hardly stood as the only example
of poor coordination on the part of the White House’s political arm. Alongside the
blue-collar strategy, Nixon, in his early days in office, launched a number of initiatives
designed to woo traditionally Democratic voters, including Latinos, southern
whites, blacks, and urban ethnic voters.23 Yet a similar slovenliness marked each new
initiative. By executive order in March 1969, for instance, Nixon created the Office
of Minority Business Enterprise, to encourage “black capitalism” programs the president
felt sure would be popular among the growing black middle class.24 Just as these

projects were getting off the ground, however, Nixon short-circuited them with the
nomination to the Supreme Court of South Carolinian Clement F. Haynsworth Jr.,
whose record, to be generous, seemed to reflect ambivalence to desegregation. Nixon
and his advisors, of course, designed the Haynsworth and follow-up nomination of
Harold Carswell as the centerpiece of another political strategy — that of cultivating
white southern support.25
The Haynsworth and Carswell imbroglios were perhaps also an effort to build
on a political theme that had worked well for Nixon (and upstart candidate George
Wallace) during the 1968 campaign — law and order. Although never specific, Nixon
promised strong initiatives aimed at “stopping the rising crime rate and for reestablishing
freedom from fear.” But the issue faded once Nixon was in office, partly
because the Nixonites discovered, as historian Michael Flamm explains, that “controlling
crime was more difficult than they [rhetorical advocates of law and order] had led
the American people to believe.”26 Short of Nixon aide Bud Krogh’s ride-alongs with
the Washington, DC, police, the issue received increasingly little attention.27
In many ways, the Nixon administration was pursuing what later critics
would identify as the most unfortunate characteristics of identity politics — an
essentialist approach in which appeals to gross stereotypes substituted for substantive
policy initiatives. But the administration’s implementation of its political initiatives
proved so ill-executed and transparent that they fell largely on deaf ears.28
Yet even as the White House and Colson appeared to have hit rock bottom,
events already were conspiring in their favor. The catalyst providing sudden life to the
blue-collar strategy was Nixon’s controversial invasion of Cambodia. The uproar that
came with the incursion caught the White House off guard. Killings at Kent State
University and Jackson State College clearly rattled the administration. Bitter protests
seemed to spring from every corner of the country; however, pro-war elements
in U.S. organized labor — located in particular at the helm of the AFL-CIO and in
the construction trades unions — deeply appreciated what they saw as tough, appropriate
action.29
The hawkishness of the AFL-CIO leadership and many — although by no
means all — union members was very much in keeping with the anticommunism
of postwar liberalism. Key union leaders, like many liberals committed to international
development, believed the Cold War required more than just an arms buildup:
it required a holistic commitment to economic, social, and political development in
areas of the world threatened by communism. Guided by a sense that such development
required, in particular, the development of “free,” independent trade unions,
organized labor became deeply involved in foreign affairs.30 The AFL, CIO, and
subsequent AFL-CIO had established a well-connected network of foreign policy
operatives around the world, often working in league with the Central Intelligence
Agency and other official U.S. agencies.
As the Cold War shifted to the Third World, so too did the attention of labor’s

internationalists. American laborites first made contact with a nascent trade union
movement in Vietnam in 1950. This movement, founded by a group of nationalists
disaffected by a brief alliance with the Viet Minh, took the name of the Vietnamese
Confederation of Christian Labor (CVTC) in 1953 but shortened the title to Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor (CVT) in the early 1960s to reflect its diverse membership.
Relations between U.S. labor and the CVTC solidified when American trade
unions contributed financially to help relocate thousands of Vietnamese workers from
above the 17th parallel in 1955, following the division of Vietnam produced by the 1954
Geneva Peace Accords. Later, American laborites working through U.S. foreign
aid agencies helped the CVT further establish itself in South Vietnam and navigate
the shoals and dangers associated with the U.S.-backed Ngo Dinh Diem regime. On
several occasions, Meany and Lovestone pressed State Department officials to shield
CVT leaders from arrest as the Ngo family grew increasingly mercurial and dangerous.
After the coup resulting in Diem’s death in 1963, the AFL-CIO sponsored
CVT President Tran Quoc Buu’s visit to Washington, DC, in the spring of 1964.
The highlight of Buu’s trip was a personal meeting between himself and President
Lyndon Johnson.31
Enthusiastic about the CVT as a vehicle for reform in troubled South Vietnam,
the AFL-CIO leadership envisioned the Vietnamese labor organization as
everything from the base for mass political mobilization to a paramilitary force
around which to rally a reticent population. Motivated by an intense anticommunism
and devotion to the CVT, the federation became early, “unstinting” backers of
Johnson’s war in Vietnam. In 1967, Meany and Lovestone arranged Agency for
International Development (AID) sponsorship of a permanent AFL-CIO labor “institute”
in Southeast Asia. The Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) was to be
funded primarily by AID, yet administered independently by the AFL-CIO — similar
to other arrangements initiated by U.S. labor and the Kennedy/Johnson administrations
in Latin America and Africa.
Having invested tremendous time and energy in Vietnam and never relinquishing
hopes that the CVT might become a vehicle for reform and national inspiration,
AFL-CIO officials regarded Nixon’s election with genuine concern. In the
wake of Kennedy’s and Johnson’s activism, the AFL-CIO leadership feared a retreat
to the reactive Eisenhower years and an abandonment of international commitments.
Nixon’s interest in refocusing foreign aid in particular worried federation officials.
The new president, upon taking office, launched plans to reform international aid by
creating the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, designed to shift aid
administration into private hands.32 The Nixon administration, AFL-CIO Vice President
Joseph Bierne warned Meany, risked “losing sight of the social development aspect”
of foreign aid, adding, “there can be very little possibility for American labor playing
a distinct positive role in international banking mechanisms.”33 The AFL-CIO’s
international labor institutions now appeared imperiled. Having established what
amounted to a sweetheart deal with AID under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
Meany and his circle increasingly feared retaliation under their political

enemy Nixon.
These concerns hung over Meany as he arrived for his first visit to the Nixon
White House — the same meeting where the president had so annoyed him with the
comment about his secretary being a fellow Catholic. Despite that road bump, the
pair had devoted two-thirds of their meeting to a wide-ranging discussion of the state
of the world. Meany lobbied the president “at length about the AFL-CIO program
of training union leaders.” Gratifyingly, Nixon “expressed interest and support for
continuation of the [labor] program.”34 Relieved that AAFLI and his other programs
were safe, Meany and most labor leaders nevertheless remained wary of Nixon.
However, the president’s invasion of Cambodia, in particular his defiant insistence
the United States would not act “like a helpless, pitiful giant,” suddenly turned
everything around. Jay Lovestone was so impressed that he arranged the clandestine
meeting with Colson described in the opening of this article. Unbeknownst to
Meany, after their initial May 5th rendezvous, Colson and Lovestone began meeting
regularly. The two arranged for Nixon personally to brief the federation’s Executive
Council on Cambodian developments, a briefing at which the president received a
particularly warm welcome.35
As the pair connived, a series of spontaneous pro-war rallies in New York
City by so-called hard hat construction workers excited the interest of Lovestone and
Colson. The counterdemonstrations began on May 8, when construction workers
attacked peace protesters in Manhattan, allegedly in retaliation for an act of desecration
against the American flag; related protests quickly flared in other cities.36 In New
York City, the hard hats, basking in media attention, began holding daily demonstrations
in the city’s financial district. Union leaders — in particular ambitious Peter
Brennan, president of the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New
York — seized control of the previously spontaneous protests.37
In many ways, the hard-hat riots better reflected a general outpouring of
worker discontent and militancy than a specific endorsement of Nixon. Already
a wave of major strikes had washed across the country. Most notably in late 1969,
147,000 electrical workers walked off their jobs at General Electric for 102 days. The
following year, 394,000 members of the United Auto Workers (UAW), demanding
double-digit percentage wage increases to counterbalance rising inflation, which the
UAW specifically blamed on Nixon, waged a two-month-long bitter strike against
General Motors.38 Like the rest of the country, blue-collar workers seemed swept up
in an ill-focused spirit of rebellion.
Yet to Colson and Lovestone, the hard hat rallies offered an alluring political
opportunity to counterbalance flaring antiwar protests around the country. Through
Lovestone, Colson urged Brennan and others to organize a major, highly publicized,
pro-war rally to be held May 20 simultaneously in several cities. Hard hat leaders
needed little prompting. Brennan and construction union leaders eagerly organized
the massive demonstration.39 In New York City, the May 20 march drew between

100,000 and 150,000 protesters; smaller rallies took place in San Diego, Pittsburgh,
Buffalo, and other cities.40
In an overt effort to align himself closer with the hard-hat demonstrations,
Nixon invited its organizers to the White House for a “serious, in-depth briefing on
the situation in Cambodia.” As cameras snapped, Brennan presented Nixon with a
hard hat, a “symbol of our support for our fighting men and for your efforts in trying
to bring the war to a proper conclusion.” Emotions swelled when Michael Donovan,
a member of the Executive Committee of Brennan’s Building and Construction
Council whose son had died in Vietnam, approached Nixon. “Mr. President,”
he said, “if someone would have had the courage to go into Cambodia sooner, they might
have captured the bullet that took my son’s life.” The president appeared “visibly
moved.” 41
Expedited by deep, painful divisions over the Vietnam War, Colson appeared
on the verge of achieving his mission. Following the visit to the White House by
the hard-hat leadership, the Nixon administration’s “political cultivation of labor”
shot into high gear. Nixon invited seventy labor leaders and their wives, including
the Meanys, to an elegant Labor Day dinner on September 7, 1970.42 The Nixonites
specifically targeted the Meany family for “cultivation.” H. R. Haldeman suggested
that Meany’s daughters “be given a certain amount of play” and be included “in Mrs.
Nixon’s tea for the wives of labor leaders.” 43 In October, Nixon summoned Meany,
AFL-CIO European agent Irving Brown, and Lovestone to the White House for a
“national security briefing.” 44 In December, Nixon met personally with AFL-CIO
Vice President Joseph Keenan, who had journeyed to Vietnam in 1967 to help launch
AAFLI. White House staffers, drawing on an inchoate identity politics, noted
opportunistically that Keenan “is a devoted Catholic and important labor leader, and is
moving away from the Democrats.” 45 White House officials gloated over the progress
they believed they made. H. R. Haldeman called the high-profile Labor Day dinner
“a real coup.” 46
Yet such gestures resonated less with labor leaders than with White House
staffers. AFL-CIO Public Relations Director Albert Zack, for instance, bemoaned
the Labor Day dinner as “politically motivated. It was all a part of the blue collar
strategy.” 47 Likewise, in responding to Nixon’s entreats, Meany was playing his own
game of hardball politics. The implied threat of an alliance with Nixon provided the
AFL-CIO with political leverage as it sought to push the Democrats toward labor’s
agenda. Noting Nixon’s “pitch,” Meany warned the Washington Post that the Democratic
Party needed to rid itself of “extremists” on the left.48 Clearly Meany sought to
enhance the AFL-CIO’s “broker” role and move the Democratic Party back toward
its traditional anticommunism.49
Aside from political wooing, blue-collar strategists made at least a half-hearted
stab at policy initiatives aimed at blue-collar workers. Assistant Secretary of Labor
Jerome Rosow issued a report in March 1970 entitled “The Problem of the BlueCollar Worker,” prescribing tax relief, subsidized housing, expanded public

transportation, and educational grants for the lower-middle class.50 But Nixon showed
little interest in the initiatives, ordering only “some initial implementation of the Rosow
blue collar report even if it is only symbolic.”51 Still, by the fall of 1970, Colson was
positively gleeful. “The ground is plowed to bring them [organized labor] into the
fold,” he pronounced.52
In reality, however, Nixon had made little headway. Neither Nixon’s cultural
outreach campaign nor his invasion of Cambodia appeared capable of cutting the
apron strings between the Democratic Party and union members — as the results of
the 1970 congressional elections quickly made manifest. In the buildup to the election,
defying Nixon’s courtship, trade unions and the rank and file pumped millions
of dollars into the campaign coffers of Democratic candidates, a trend that was
“interpreted by many labor leaders that blue collar workers are not turning
conservative.”53 That November Democrats added nine seats to their majority in the
House of Representatives and three seats in the Senate. “GOP Aimed Campaign Strategy
at Wrong Group” blared a Washington Post headline in the election’s aftermath. Noting
the success of Pennsylvania gubernatorial candidate Milton Shapp, who won 91 percent
of the labor vote, pollster George Gallup concluded that Nixon had bet too much that
the “hard hat or otherwise was angry, frustrated and bitter at national conditions and
ready to switch parties.” Economic priorities stressed by Democrats, Gallup explained,
had triumphed over the amorphous “law-and-order” cultural campaign mounted by
Republicans for union voters.54 If any in the White House had thought their cultural
campaign was making headway, they now had definitive evidence to the contrary.
Angered by the election results, some in the White House called for the abandonment
of the blue-collar strategy. Nixon’s chief speechwriter, Jim Keogh, labeled
Colson’s work “a mistake” and complained that after the Labor Day dinner, union
bosses “went out and bludgeoned us with rhetoric and money.” Worse, he argued, the
Colson mission was fatally flawed in its assumption that union leaders and members
saw things the same way. “I hold the belief,” insisted Keogh, “that even rank-and-file
labor union members tend to look with suspicion on big labor leaders.”55
The blue-collar strategy that had briefly taken flight following the Cambodian
invasion now lay in ruins by the end of 1970 — and the following year was to
bring no revival. As U.S. troop withdrawals quickened, the war in Indochina “virtually
disappeared as a campaign issue.”56 For organized labor, a new crisis took center
stage — the sliding economy. In 1971, unemployment shot up almost two percentage
points to approach 6 percent. Meanwhile, stagflation — stagnant wages and rising
prices — first reared its ugly head as the cost of living inched upward, accompanied by
rising unemployment. The hard hats were hardest hit. By mid-1971, unemployment
among construction workers stood at twice the national average with some trades
edging toward 50 percent unemployment.57
The souring economy became a bone of bitter contention between Nixon
and almost the entire organized labor movement. Meany, insisting that “the only
game plan for America is full employment,” relentlessly flayed Nixon’s handling of

the economy, prescribing instead expanded federal spending to address the downturn.
58 Within the White House, however, organized labor increasingly became a
fall guy for inflation and economic trouble. “Our problems come because of the high
wages demanded by the workers of this country,” complained White House eco nomic
advisor Arthur Burns.59 Likewise, Council of Economic Advisors Chairman
Paul McCracken worried “the construction industry continues to cause us extremely
serious problems in our attempts to reduce inflation. Wage increases appear to be
accelerating instead of subsiding.” 60 Far from cultivating labor, some in the Nixon
administration increasingly moved to scapegoat blue-collar workers.
Nixon’s August 1971 announcement of price and wage controls further fueled
mounting hostility between labor and the White House. To many trade unionists,
the announcement seemed a negation of a key principle of postwar liberalism — “full
employment,” an offshoot of Keynesian economics, in which aggressive fiscal spending
became the prescription for economic growth. As such, Meany promptly positioned
himself as the leading critic of price and wage controls. He pounded the Nixon
plan as “an assertion of dictatorial power completely foreign to the American concept
of freedom.” 61 When Nixon appeared before the AFL-CIO biannual convention in
November 1971, Meany and the assemblage was dismissive, borderline rude, to the
president.62 For more than a year, Meany spewed venom at Nixon, at one point calling
the plan “a tax bonanza to American corporations at the expense of American
workers.” 63 His attacks on Nixon drew rare praise from the media in the process.
Meany graced the cover of both Time and Life magazines. “At 77,” waxed Life magazine
columnist Hugh Sidey, “George Meany has been reborn.” 64 Even his enemies
in the labor movement marveled at his new lease on life. “George is acting the great
trade union leader he is capable of being. . . . If this fine man could reconcile himself
to the idea that the war is one of the blackest pages in America’s history, he would
soon develop into one of the best loved labor leaders in the world,” privately noted
Patrick Gorman, the adamantly antiwar president of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and a frequent Meany critic.65
Watching his cultivation campaign sputter, Colson angrily blamed the press
for “trying their best to drive a wedge between labor and ourselves.” He urged Nixon
to let Meany “know that the door remains open.” 66 Yet other factions in the White
House demanded the door be slammed shut. Special Assistant to the President Desmond
Baker circulated a caustic memo assailing Meany as “so interested in seeing the
Democratic Party recapture the White House in 1972 that he will oppose President
Nixon whatever he does.” 67 White House staffers convened a special meeting to
coordinate a response to Meany’s attacks. The ad hoc committee, which included Colson
(now evidently ready to take a harder line), George Shultz, Haldeman, and Treasury
Secretary John Connally, resolved to freeze Meany out; the president “should not at
this time engage in any further dialogue with Meany privately or publicly.” In public,
the administration would seek to “deliberately isolate Meany. . . . This effort if properly
done could separate Meany from his membership.” 68
The nadir between Nixon and the AFL-CIO came in March 1972, when a

truculent Meany made a public show of angrily quitting the president’s Pay Board,
the agency that oversaw the administration’s economic controls program.69 Embittered
by Meany’s continuing hostility, Colson decided to abandon completely the carrot
and reach for the stick. He asked White House aide General Alexander Haig to
conduct an “exhaustive” review of federal funds “squirreled away in various accounts”
designated for AFL-CIO international programs. “I have no problem if the AFLCIO
finds out what the White House is asking,” added Colson. “In fact, that might
be very salutary under the circumstances of Mr. Meany’s present silence on international
issues and the vicious attacks on the President on domestic issues.”70 The message
was pure blackmail: future outspokenness would imperil labor’s overseas initiatives,
including AAFLI. Haig’s investigation revealed roughly $6 million earmarked
for AFL-CIO’s 1972 foreign operations, with $1.6 million designated for AAFLI.71
Meany’s continuing attacks on Nixon now jeopardized the federation’s generous
government
subsidies.
Yet even as tensions threatened to boil over, Vietnam remained a point of
commonality between the administration and many in organized labor. In 1971, for
instance, on the eve of a national presidential television address on Vietnam, National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger journeyed the several blocks between the White
House and AFL-CIO headquarters to privately brief Meany on the contents of the
speech. “I know you’ve got your problems on the economy but we appreciate your
support in this area,” Kissinger told the labor chieftain. “It involves the fabric of our
country and maybe, if we do not succeed, the country won’t be worth being President
of.” Meany readily concurred and complained of the damage done by recent revelations
regarding the My Lai massacre — “the result of this peacenik-sort of pounding
of the press,” according to the labor chief. Meany and Kissinger then swapped stories
about facing down antiwar demonstrators on college campuses, Kissinger at MIT
and Meany at Randolph-Macon College. “I think the professors are worse than the
students,” opined Meany to the former Harvard University faculty member.72 In the
face of stiffening opposition to the war, the administration and the AFL-CIO leadership
still relied upon each other for mutual support.
Trouble in Vietnam, in fact, brought the first inklings of life back to the bluecollar
strategy in a year and a half. On March 30, 1972, the North Vietnamese army
launched the Easter Offensive, a conventional military invasion of the South, designed
to capitalize on diminishing U.S. combat strength. For several weeks the fate of South
Vietnam hung in the balance. Finally Nixon turned the tide by unleashing a massive
bombing campaign, code named Linebacker I. During the bitter fighting, North
Vietnamese imprisoned or killed some thirty lower-level CVT officers and left thousands
of CVT families homeless. In the hard-hit border province of Binh Long, about
50 miles north of Saigon, the invaders murdered the entire CVT provincial leadership.
Struggling, South Vietnamese labor called upon the AFL-CIO for help, and Meany
responded immediately with an emergency cash grant.73 The AFL-CIO Executive
Council ominously warned that the outcome of the battle for South Vietnam would
“affect profoundly the destiny of our country.”74 As the country moved into an election

year in 1972, Vietnam emerged as the litmus test for the AFL-CIO president.
Asked by an interviewer if he wanted to see Nixon beaten, Meany responded, “I don’t
want to see him defeated by somebody who is advocating surrender. I don’t believe in
surrender in Vietnam.”75
Determined to preserve its hawkish agenda in Vietnam (still very centered on
supporting the struggling CVT), the AFL-CIO saw few attractive options among
Democratic presidential contenders. Key figures in the party, in the minds of many
in organized labor, seemed to have forsaken the Cold War anticommunism of postwar
liberalism. Even old stalwart Hubert Humphrey, labor’s champion in 1968, had
turned sharply against the Vietnam War, as had the 1968 Democratic nominee for
vice president, Senator Edmund Muskie, also a contender for the 1972 nomination.
Federation hopes rested solely with Washington Senator Henry Jackson, an increasingly
rare liberal cold warrior who remained committed to a “full employment”
agenda but still took a hard line on Vietnam. By spring, however, the worst case scenario
came to pass: Senator George McGovern, unapologetically demanding immediate
withdrawal, overwhelmed Humphrey, Muskie, and Jackson in the Democratic
primaries.
The AFL-CIO leadership recoiled at McGovern’s swift march to the Democratic
nomination. “My right arm will wither before I vote for a McGovern,” Lovestone
told Colson.76 Compared to Nixon, of course, McGovern’s record, although
hardly gleaming, was prolabor. His position on Vietnam, however, rendered him
untenable to the federation. Moreover, the South Dakotan not only advocated immediate
withdrawal, he vocally rejected wholesale the anticommunist, Cold War agenda.
In a 1971 fund-raising letter that much concerned AFL-CIO staffers, McGovern
suggested that retreat from Vietnam would mark only the beginning of his crusade to
“free” the country “from the last vestiges of cold war paranoia.” Seeming almost to
delight in offending the ardent anticommunist sensibilities of Meany and his circle,
McGovern told an interviewer, “I think communism is another economic system that
doesn’t happen to fit my view of how society ought to be organized, but I’m willing
to live in a world of diversity.”77
George Meany was not willing to “live in a world of diversity.” Seeking to
“rescue” the Democratic Party, Meany held a “secret meeting” with Senator Ted
Kennedy in May. He urged the Massachusetts senator, whom Meany considered “the
lesser evil,” to enter the race.78 Kennedy, however, demurred, and the Democratic
convention that year only confirmed to Meany how much ground labor had lost. Union
leaders found themselves unwanted guests as young activists swarmed the convention,
treating their elders with barely concealed contempt. Calls for immediate withdrawal
from Vietnam echoed throughout the convention hall. Political ground had
shifted dramatically, and labor now found itself on hostile terrain at a Democratic
Party convention. Party insurgents and labor regulars seemed almost unrelated species.
Labor delegates complained bitterly they were treated rudely and dismissively
by the McGovernites planning the convention. Surveying the scene at Miami Beach,
Meany lamented the Democratic Party’s seizure by “people who looked like Jacks,

acted like Jills, and had the odor of Johns about them.”79
Out of the ashes of the labor-liberal alliance rose a revived blue-collar strategy.
A few days after the Democratic convention, the AFL-CIO Executive Council
voted, 27 to 3, to abstain from issuing an endorsement. President Nixon greeted the
news enthusiastically as carrying the “potential of becoming one of the most important
developments of the 1972 campaign.”80 Already Nixon had received the endorsement
of the renegade Teamsters Executive Council, delivered personally by the council
to the president at a poolside reception in San Clemente.81 Roughly a week later,
Meany joined Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, and Secretary of State
William Rogers for a well-publicized round of golf, ending a year and a half of bitter
sniping between plumber and president. On the links, Meany assured Nixon of his
neutrality.82 The friendly game combined with Meany’s known contempt for McGovern
amounted to a Nixon endorsement.
Meany grew increasingly annoyed as McGovern’s unfolding campaign showed
no sign of moderation (while revealing ample signs of disorganization). Following the
well-managed Republican convention, Meany asked George Shultz for a private meeting.
Avoiding a direct endorsement, the AFL-CIO president carefully reviewed for
Nixon’s treasury secretary how the president might appeal to trade unionists. Despite
his doubts about détente (of which he always remained a critic), Meany thought Nixon
to be “perfect on foreign policy.” Although a supporter of civil rights, Meany explained
he had come to appreciate Nixon’s reservations on busing. On the controversial topic
of defense spending, the AFL-CIO president, a strong proponent of Keynesian spending,
commended the president for emphasizing national security without connecting
the issue to jobs. Workers, Meany explained, understand the importance of defense
spending, but to speak openly about its economic impact would “just undermine the
national security argument.” In the margins of John Ehrlichman’s transcript of the
meeting, Nixon scribbled “right” alongside Meany’s advice.83 Still, Nixon, eager to
make defense spending an issue to attract working Democrats, ordered the Defense
Department to prepare a general report on the relationship between military spending
and economic growth. The resulting study, The Economics of Defense, essentially
made the case for military Keynesianism by predicting difficult times should McGovern
get his defense cuts.84 In stump speeches, Nixon, adopting Meany’s counsel, never
openly linked defense spending and employment, but the Defense Department’s
report performed that task for the president. The issue of defense jobs, clearly related
to the AFL-CIO’s full-employment economic strategy and the war in Southeast Asia,
hung over the campaign.
His blue-collar strategy rising like the phoenix, Colson scrambled again to
shore up a cultural appeal to the nation’s workers. Again, he relied heavily on a
supposedly charismatic figure to rally support. In the summer of 1972, the Nixon
campaign hired Michael Balzano, “an ex-garbage collector who worked his way nights
to a Ph.D.” to cement ties with “ethnic and blue-collar areas.” Colson assured the
president Balzano was “a solid man” who knew “how to relate to Middle American
constituencies.”85

With the dubious weight of Colson and Balzano behind him, Nixon did win
the bulk of the blue-collar vote in November, winning 57 percent of voters from
union households.86 Yet the loyalties of blue-collar voters remained more “fluid” than
Nixon might have liked, and, reflecting the limits of the blue-collar strategy, workers
did not favor Republican congressional candidates. Many split their ballots between a
Republican president and Democratic Congress — hardly a dramatic political
realignment, or the passing of postwar liberalism.87 The Democratic Party, concluded
U.S. News and World Report, in the wake of Nixon’s victory, “at the grass roots,
demonstrated that it is still a strong majority party.” Republicans lost two senate seats,
and despite pickups in the House, still faced a strong Democratic majority. “It was a
personal triumph for Mr. Nixon,” mused RNC Chairman Robert Dole, “not a party
triumph.”88
Still with his “personal triumph,” Nixon continued to press his blue-collar
strategy. He appointed as secretary of labor Peter Brennan, president of the Building
and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York and organizer of the
Manhattan hard-hat rallies. The president also revived his courtship of labor leaders.
When the January 1973 Paris Accords finally ended direct U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
Nixon sent Meany an appreciative note: “Now that we have finally achieved
peace with honor in Vietnam, I particularly want you to know how much I have
appreciated the support you have given during these difficult years to the policies that
made that achievement possible. . . . history will prove you have been right.”89
Without the Vietnam issue, however, the blue-collar strategy quickly lost
its potency. Severe stagflation, ironically seen by many economists as the result of
Vietnam-era spending habits, rippled across the nation in 1973. The Nixon-labor
dalliance unraveled yet again amid bitter exchanges over the handling of the economy
and the brewing Watergate scandal. At the tenth biannual AFL-CIO convention, in
October 1973, delegates unanimously demanded Nixon’s resignation. Meanwhile, the
AFL-CIO’s relations with Secretary of Labor Peter Brennan deteriorated to such an
extent that Meany insisted on conducting business solely with Secretary of Treasury
George Shultz, whom he regarded as more competent and someone with the president’s
ear.90
In the wake of Watergate and the economic collapse of 1973, the blue-collar strategy
essentially died — mourned by virtually no one. Hardly the product of “cultural
vision” or sensitivity to supposedly underlying class tensions, the blue-collar strategy
was less sophisticated, ultimately operating only in fits and starts. The unique politics
of the Vietnam War, in particular the AFL-CIO’s heavy investment in a South
Vietnamese labor movement, briefly enlivened the strategy and (alongside the
incompetence of the McGovern campaign) perhaps helped Nixon win the 1972 election.
With the Vietnam issue removed from the table briefly in 1971 and then permanently in
1973, the strategy — for both union leaders and the rank and file — floundered. Never
again would trade union leaders come as close to endorsing a Republican president
as they had in 1972.

Some have argued that Nixon’s blue-collar strategy set the stage for the rise
of the so-called Reagan Democrats a decade later — that while the president failed in
cultivating the leadership, he made gains with the rank and file.91 But the 1970 and
1972 elections hardly suggested potential realignment. Rather, the majority of workers
and trade union leaders remained wedded to the postwar liberal agenda of activist
anticommunism abroad and full-employment economics at home. Facing McGovern
in 1972, Nixon essentially seized that agenda by promising a strong foreign policy and
promoting military Keynesianism. Beyond this, Nixon never made a serious attempt
to overcome the cultural and ideological gulf separating him and the organized labor
movement, and never moved to provide working families with any serious safeguards
as they entered a period of prolonged economic challenges. Without the Vietnam
War, the blue-collar strategy would have remained a figment of Charles Colson’s
imagination — and even with the war, it proved to be little more.
Revisionists who praise Nixon’s cultural sensitivity are correct on at least one
account: the president and his political advisors did think inordinately in terms of
group identity — and they were hardly alone. By the late 1960s, many on the far left
no longer adhered to the once-ubiquitous principles of liberal universalism — the belief
that all, regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity, shared an essential common humanity.
Instead of moving beyond group identity, advocacy groups for African Americans,
women, and others began espousing a new politics grounded in group membership.
Identity politics remains the dominant political philosophy of our times. Nixon obviously
shared little in common with most of this rising mentality.92 Yet in his political
machinations — often grounded in simplistic stereotypes such as in the case of the
blue-collar strategy — Nixon and his aides engaged the worst elements of identity
politics.93
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